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Abstract: 
In this paper, I develop and test the hypothesis that system trust – trust in the reliability, ef-
fectiveness, and legitimacy of social institutions – promotes cooperation in social dilemmas 
and the provision of public goods, focusing then on the example of recycling. I discuss three 
models that can explain recycling behavior (rational choice, low-cost hypothesis, dual-
process theory) and show how they link incentives and attitudes. All three models claim that 
incentives are an important factor mediating the attitude-behavior link, but they develop con-
tradicting hypotheses about the direction of this effect. I use survey data collected by Sønder-
skov and Daugbjerg (2011) to advance an empirical test.
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 I find a positive and significant 
interaction between the attitude of system trust and recycling costs, as well as a negative and 
significant interaction between system trust and recycling benefits. The data rule out the ra-
tional choice and low-cost hypothesis explanation of recycling behavior. Instead, they indi-
cate that attitudes moderate the impact of the incentive structure, increasing cooperation in 
collective action dilemmas irrespective of the costs associated with compliance. 
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1. Introduction 
In the face of global warming and increasing resource scarcity, the intelligent use of raw ma-
terials has become a prime concern in the organization of modern economic activity. Recy-
cling, that is, the re-processing of used materials and waste into new products, has a potential 
to reduce resource consumption, energy usage, greenhouse-gas emission, and air- and water-
pollution by lowering the need for conventional waste disposal. The organization of efficient 
recycling systems has thus risen in public interest and concern (Stern 2007, IPCC 2007).  
However, individual recycling vividly illustrates a typical collective action dilemma. Individ-
ual participation in voluntary recycling programs and the adoption of recycling behavior 
helps to cut resource consumption and improve the environment. But the final outcome can 
be enjoyed by anyone, whether he or she recycles or not. In other words, recycling is a public 
good; its provision depends on the successful cooperation of a large number of individuals.  
In this paper, I develop and test the hypothesis that system trust – trust in the reliability, effec-
tiveness, and legitimacy of social institutions – can foster cooperation in social dilemmas and 
promote the provision of public goods, such as recycling. An actor who maintains a high lev-
el of system trust assumes that the actions of others are effectively regulated and structured 
by the prevalent norms and rules within the social system (McKnight et al. 1998). Important-
ly, this includes the expectation that norm violations are effectively sanctioned; with high 
system trust, norm enforcement is taken-for-granted. If this is true, then the presence or ab-
sence of system trust should be important to cooperation because it influences the perception 
of punishment and sanctioning mechanisms. 
Moreover, system trust can be regarded as an important part of the prevalent culture of trust 
in a society. System trust rests on the assumption that other actors in the social system do 
equally trust in it. It therefore provides a background of normality on which routine collective 
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action can unfold (Möllering 2006). Apart from sensitizing actors towards the institutional 
sanctioning and punishment potential, it also encourages them to regard the status quo nor-
mative order as legitimate. That is, high system trust may shape compliance to norms, institu-
tional regulations and procedures because social institutions, when regarded as taken-for-
granted and legitimate, incline actors to keep conformity to the “rules of the game” across 
different contexts. System trust, in this sense, may work akin to an intrapersonal stable trait, 
or “meta-norm,” that influences the overall probability of norm-compliance. In essence, per-
sons high in system trust more readily cooperate because “that is what one ought to do.” 
Yet, while the importance of system trust to the functioning of modern societies is commonly 
emphasized in theory, few studies have linked it to individual action and choice; empirical 
evidence connecting system trust to cooperation is sparse. The aim of the present study is 
threefold: first, it provides a long-missing theoretical explanation for the impact of system 
trust on individual action and choice. Second, it delivers an empirical assessment of the effect 
of system trust on collective action. Third, and most importantly, the paper presents a com-
parative test of three different theoretical models explaining the link between attitudes and 
behavior, relating to the attitude of system trust and recycling behavior in particular. In recent 
years, the empirical instability of the attitude-behavior link has stirred increasing concern 
among researchers (see Kroneberg et al. 2010, Mehlkopp & Graeff 2010). 
To explore the role of system trust on individual action in a collective action dilemma, the 
study relies on a unique survey that was designed to assess the role played by trust in pro-
environmental behavior in four countries (see Sønderskov & Daugbjerg 2011). This survey 
assesses self-reported measures of recycling behavior and includes survey indicators of sys-
tem trust, which will be used to test three models explaining cooperation and recycling.  
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Section 2.1 shortly introduces the concept of system trust. Section 2.2 presents a theoretical 
link between system trust and collective action. I argue that system trust can be influential 
because it directs actors towards the sanctioning and punishment potential of institutions. 
When a situation is defined as one being under social control, this may lead to unconditional 
cooperation, even in a social dilemma situation such as recycling. I then proceed in section 
2.3 to look at a more general question which has plagued environmental research: there is a 
tremendous variation in the magnitudes and correlations between environmental attitudes and 
environmental behavior. I discuss several theoretical models (rational choice, low-cost hy-
pothesis, dual-process theory) that can explain why the link between attitudes and behavior is 
unstable. Importantly, these frameworks claim that the incentive structure is an important 
mediating factor of the attitude-behavior link. Yet, they imply contradicting hypotheses 
which can be tested against each other. Sections 3 and 4 develop and conduct a comparative 
empirical test to model and explain recycling behavior. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. System Trust and Cooperation 
System trust refers to abstract institutions or social systems as objects of trust.
2
 It is created 
and sustained by the continual, ongoing, and confirmatory experience of a social system’s 
functioning. In contrast to interpersonal trust, system trust does not concern social uncertainty 
with respect to another’s action or a generalized expectation of trustworthiness. It addresses 
the global characteristics of social institutions: their primary goals, legitimacy, structure, and 
operation, and the effectiveness of the sanction mechanisms which structure and control in-
teractions in the social world (Zucker 1986, Giddens 1990). Trust researchers regard system 
trust as an indispensable ingredient to the smooth functioning of social systems in modern 
                                                 
2 Another term commonly used is institutional trust, which is identical in meaning and concept. 
5 
 
society. It warrants a constant reproduction of social systems in everyday interactions and 
their aggregation into stable social structure (Lewis & Weigert 1985a, b). 
System trust ultimately depends on a form of generalized trust, or “trust in trust” (Luhmann 
1979: 66f.). That is, it rests on the assumption that other actors in the social system do equally 
trust in it. An actor who maintains a high level of system trust believes that the actions of 
other actors in the system are structured by institutionalized norms, rules, and procedures. 
Importantly, system trust increases the expectation that norm violations will be punished; it 
focuses the actors on the sanctioning potential of institutions (Shapiro 1987, Misztal 1996, 
McKnight et al. 2001). With high system trust, norm enforcement is taken for granted. 
At the same time, the basis of system trust is the appearance of normality (Luhmann 1979: 
22, Lewis & Weigert 1985a: 463, Misztal 2001). This indicates that there is a link joining 
system trust to the concepts of familiarity and confidence: system trust situationally manifests 
in the form of taken-for-granted background assumptions, that is, in familiarity with, and con-
fidence in, the functioning of the system and its primary goals, rules, and procedures 
(McKnight et al. 1998, Möllering 2006). If an actor believes that a social institution is effec-
tively sanctioning free-riding behavior, then norm-compliance is often regarded as a default 
strategy and sanctions become a tangible threat. In sum, high system trust adds to the per-
ceived validity and legitimacy of institutions and institutional control; it also creates situa-
tional normality and taken-for-grantedness, which lay the ground for routine behavior. 
2.2. Linking Trust to Collective Action 
However, the presence or absence of system trust alone does not explain cooperation in a 
collective action dilemma. To understand how it can promote collective action, I here extend 
an argument proposed by Sønderskov (2011), who in his work establishes a link between 
generalized social trust and the social exchange heuristic (Yamagishi et al. 2007). Principally 
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speaking, the social exchange heuristic is an evolutionary adaptation of the human organism 
for facilitating social exchange, a “cognitive bias that perceives free riding in a situation as 
neither possible nor desirable” (ibid. 10). If activated, it prevents the subjective perception of 
opportunities for defection.  
As Sønderskov argues, generalized social trust promotes a positive expectation of trustwor-
thiness and, coincidentally, one of reciprocal cooperation. In this way, it increases the likeli-
hood of the activation of the social exchange heuristic, and thereby motivates individuals to 
cooperate even in social dilemmas. Empirically, Sønderskov finds a consistent main effect of 
social trust on recycling behavior. 
At the same time, the activation of the social exchange heuristic crucially depends on the 
sanctioning potential of institutions and the costs of detection and punishment that come 
along with free-riding, and in fact take precedence over “expected cooperation.” According to 
Yamagishi et al. (2007), the social exchange heuristic is activated by cues that hint at the 
presence of a situation of social exchange. Actors are assumed to make subjective inferences 
about the state of the world, and evaluate the potential errors of this inference process. Im-
portantly, the inference process is unconscious and automatic, and it is concerned with the 
question of whether or not free riding is likely to be detected, and whether or not punishment 
is a credible threat (ibid: 264f.). If the threat of sanctioning and punishment is credible, then 
this automatically activates the social exchange heuristic. In short, whenever a situation is 
defined as being under social or institutional control, the alternative of defection is simply 
excluded from perception. This leads actors to automatically cooperate in social dilemmas 
and provide resources and effort to the production of a public good such as recycling.  
This establishes a theoretical link between system trust and the activation of the social ex-
change heuristic: system trust influences our perception of institutional control and norm en-
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forcement, and it promotes a view that the normative orders found in the life-world are legit-
imate. This effect may matter even in contexts where a factual sanctioning is unlikely to oc-
cur, or punishment mechanisms are virtually absent, because actors subjectively define a situ-
ation accordingly. For example, the threat of being detected as a “recycling free rider” and 
the associated punishment costs are, except for very severe breaches of regional recycling 
regulations, often minimal. But in influencing the probability of the heuristic activation inde-
pendently of the specific context, system trust leads to more cooperation nevertheless; in the 
applied case, it should positively affect recycling behavior. Actors with a high level of system 
trust are, in a sense, “biased” towards perceiving situations as being under social or institu-
tional control. More generally speaking, I argue that system trust can work akin to an in-
trapersonal “meta-norm” that amplifies and boosts norm-conformity over and above the ef-
fect of the specific attitude, norm, or rule in a specific context. With respect collective action, 
I hypothesize that high system trust positively influences recycling behavior. 
2.3. Explaining Environmental Behavior: Low-Costs or Adaptive Rationality? 
Past research has also documented that the cost- and opportunity structure is important for 
recycling behavior (Steg & Vlek 2009). However, the SEH framework cannot explain how 
these parameters relate to cooperation and recycling. In essence, these structural parameters 
do neither indicate social exchange nor punishment and detection contingencies as such. 
Therefore, they are not addressed by the heuristic and the inference process around which it is 
centered. In the following, I discuss three alternative models that can accommodate both fac-
tors and provide a theoretical basis to derive hypotheses about the interplay of attitudes and 
the cost-benefit structure of a public good problem.  
A widely accepted baseline model that puts a theoretical underpinning on a “main” effect of 
the cost-benefit structure on recycling behavior is traditional rational choice (RC) theory. RC 
models explain behavior as a result of rational choice among alternatives which, given pref-
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erences, constraints and beliefs, actors weigh and evaluate in order to choose the alternative 
which satisfies their preferences best and maximizes their expected utility (Gintis 2007). Ac-
cording to this framework, an actor engages in recycling and waste separation only if the ex-
pected utility of recycling, minus the costs associated with it, exceeded that of conventional 
waste disposal. Thus, RC predicts a negative effect of recycling costs, and a positive effect of 
recycling benefits. In the “wide” interpretation of RC (Opp 1999), attitudes can also enter the 
utility of the actor in the form of an intrinsic utility that is derived from attitude-conform be-
havior, or in the form of intrinsic costs from cognitive dissonance in the case of attitude-
inconsistent behavior. Note that a standard RC model predicts additive effects of the cost-
benefit structure and intrinsic factors, such as attitudes and internalized norms, and no inter-
action effect. 
A different view on the interplay between attitudes and the incentive structure of recycling is 
provided by the “low-cost-hypothesis” (Diekmann & Preisendörfer 2003). According to the 
low-cost-hypothesis, attitudes and norms influence behavior in low-cost situations only. The 
additional costs that derive from norm-compliance or attitude-consistent action must be eval-
uated relative to the alternatives of defection and attitude-inconsistency. This is equivalent to 
postulating a negative effect of the costs associated with following a norm or attitude. With 
respect to recycling behavior, the low-cost hypothesis assumes that an increase in recycling 
costs may induce a shift to conventional waste disposal, once the costs of recycling become 
too high. This does not add to the RC perspective. But in addition, the low-cost-hypothesis is 
often used to justify and predict an interaction effect: a “specific” version of the model as-
sumes that the effect of attitudes decreases with increasing costs of norm compliance (Best & 
Kroneberg 2012). As the costs increase, the impact of the attitude or norm becomes less sig-
nificant to the choice of action; the probability of norm-compliance decreases. This is equiva-
9 
 
lent to claiming a negative interaction effect between attitudes and the cost-structure of the 
situation. 
A third explanatory model is based on social-psychological dual-process theories. The most 
important difference to RC models and the low-cost-hypothesis is the assumption that a high 
match or “fit” between an accessible attitude and situational cues can trigger an automatic 
activation of the attitude or norm, together with its associated cognitions, affects and behav-
ioral dispositions (see Chaiken & Trope 1999). In other words, dual-process models predict 
that norms and attitudes can immediately lead to consistent behavior without a rational evalu-
ation of costs and benefits, given that situational cues indicate their appropriateness and the 
norm or attitude is highly accessible to the actor. To model this aspect of adaptive rationality, 
I use the Model of Frame Selection (Esser 2001, Kroneberg 2011, see Kroneberg 2010 for a 
brief introduction), a formalized version of dual-process accounts which provides a tractable 
modeling of the key components and their interrelations.  
Contrasting a rational to an automatic mode, the mode-selection threshold, which governs the 
activation of either information processing mode during interpretation and choice, depends on 
the following parameters: 
- Opportunity p (time, cognitive capacity) 
- Motivation U (“utility of appropriateness” and opportunity cost of inference errors) 
- Cognitive effort and costs C 
- Chronic accessibility aj of a script that regulates action (i.e. a norm or attitude) 
In a simplified version of the MFS (Kroneberg et al. 2010), the mode-selection threshold defines 
the parameter conditions for the activation of the automatic mode in the form of an inequality. If 
unfulfilled, the rational mode will be activated: 
aj > 1 – C / (p * U) 
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Among other things, this threshold postulates that, as the chronic accessibility aj of an inter-
nalized norm or attitude increases, the activation of the automatic mode becomes more likely. 
Vice versa, this decreases the probability of selecting the rational processing mode. With high 
accessibility, a controlled evaluation of costs and benefits action becomes less likely, leading 
to automatic, attitude-consistent behavior. In other words, the model predicts a decreasing 
effect of instrumental incentives, such as material costs or benefits, with increasing attitude 
strength or norm internalization. With respect to recycling behavior, this amounts to predict-
ing a decrease of cost effects with increasing attitude strength, and thus to predicting a posi-
tive interaction between recycling costs and system trust. When system trust is high, costs do 
not matter to the actors anymore. Then, actors unconditionally cooperate in the collective 
action dilemma irrespective of the costs associated with compliance. Note that the predicted 
sign of this effect is opposed to the sign predicted by the extended low-cost-hypothesis. More 
importantly, the two models postulate different underlying mechanisms that explain the pro-
posed interactions: based on the low-cost hypothesis, behavioral costs moderate the effect of 
attitudes. In contrast, in the MFS framework, attitudes moderate the effect of behavioral costs 
and, more generally speaking, that of instrumental incentives. 
Note that the MFS framework and the process of mode-selection can also be used to explain 
the activation of the social exchange heuristic. From the perspective of adaptive rationality, 
heuristic activation can be reconstructed as a problem of defining a situation as a cooperative 
and communal exchange. Thus, we can re-think the social exchange heuristic as a special 
aspect of the “framing” a situation, a fundamental and ever-present aspect of cognition. How-
ever, the principles of adaptive rationality equally apply to the activation of situational taxon-
omies, or “frames,” just as they govern the activation of attitudes, norms and other “scripts.” 
Stated in this way, a link between system trust and recycling behavior can also be established: 
system trust influences the framing of the collective good dilemma. Actors with high system 
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trust more readily frame the situation of waste disposal as one that is under institutional con-
trol and legitimate, leading to higher levels of norm compliance and routine conformity, and 
thus preventing a rational consideration of the costs and benefits associated with it. 
2.4. Summary of Hypotheses 
I have argued above that system trust is an important factor governing the activation of the 
social exchange heuristic; it focuses actors on the sanctioning potential and threat of punish-
ment that comes from social institutions and also provides the ground for routine conformity. 
Actors with high system trust are pushed towards recognizing the recycling dilemma as being 
under institutional control, which activates the social exchange heuristic and promotes public 
good provision and cooperation: 
H1: Actors with high system trust recycle more readily than actors with low system trust (positive 
main effect).  
Concerning the impact of the cost-benefit structure, Sønderskov (2011) tests the hypothesis 
that an effect of social trust only exists when actors perceive the recycling dilemma as a col-
lective action problem, since generalized perceptions of other´s trustworthiness only then 
become truly relevant. In contrast, the social exchange heuristic and generalized social trust 
should not matter when recycling is perceived as having private benefits. Thus, he proposes 
an interaction between generalized social trust and public good perception. He uses an item 
with the following question to operationalize the perception of a public good dilemma: “If I 
couldn’t recycle, it would be difficult for me to dispose of all my refuse.” When reverse-
coded, this item measures the presence or absence of private benefits of recycling, and thus 
operationalizes an aspect of the cost-benefit structure of the collective action dilemma.  
The main effect of benefits can be explained from the rational choice perspective: all else 
being equal, private benefits should encourage recycling behavior, their absence decrease it. 
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According to the adaptive rationality perspective, this effect is counterbalanced by high sys-
tem trust, which can trigger automatic compliance irrespective of whether or not private ben-
efits accrue. Generally speaking, the impact of instrumental incentives is expected to decrease 
with increasing accessibility of a norm or attitude. Thus, we can also predict an interaction 
effect that is opposite in sign to that of private benefits: 
H2: The perception of recycling as a means to obtain private benefits increases recycling be-
havior (positive main effect, rational choice). 
H2a: The positive effect of private benefits on recycling behavior is moderated by system 
trust: high system trust decreases instrumental concerns stemming from private recycling 
benefits. With high system trust, benefits are irrelevant (negative interaction, MFS). 
Concerning the effects of recycling costs and system trust, all three models which were dis-
cussed in section 2.3 unequivocally predict a negative main effect of the costs associated with 
recycling. In short, an increase in recycling costs decreases the probability of recycling be-
havior:  
H3: Recycling costs decrease recycling behavior (negative main effect). 
On the other hand, the rational choice, low-cost- and adaptive-rationality models each predict 
a unique interaction between recycling costs and system trust in their effect on recycling be-
havior. The models yield the following concurrent hypotheses, which can be compared: 
H3a: The effects of recycling costs and system trust are additive (no interaction, RC). 
H3b: The (positive) effect of system trust decreases with increasing recycling costs (negative 
interaction, low-cost hypothesis). 
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H3c: The (negative) effect of recycling costs decreases with increasing system trust (positive 
interaction, adaptive rationality). 
All in all, the theory discussed here provides a solid theoretical underpinning of attitudinal 
influences on recycling, which were developed here for the specific measure of system trust. 
The three models can guide a re-analysis of the recycling survey data. To test the hypotheses 
discussed above, I rely on a unique survey about recycling and organic-food consumption 
which was conducted in four different countries: Denmark, Sweden, UK and USA.  
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Measures 
The dependent variable recycling behavior is measured using three items measuring paper, 
battery and electronics recycling activity (see Sønderskov & Daugbjerg (2011) for a detailed 
discussion of the COP Survey data-set and Appendix A2 for items and coding procedures). 
Subjects could indicate how much a share of their waste they recycle on a five-point Likert-
type scale. Recycling behavior will be constructed as the normalized mean of the three ques-
tions, ranging between zero and one. 
System trust (ST) will be measured using five questions that prompt the respondent to rate 
how much he “personally trusts each of the following institutions,” asking then to rate on a 
ten-point Likert-type scale (0=“no trust at all”; 10=”complete trust”) how much the respond-
ent trust the legal system, parliament, police, civil service, and government. Factor analyses 
confirm that these items measure a single dimension and that the scale is internally consistent 
(one factor retained with EV: 3.18, Cronbach´s alpha: 0.89). System trust will be constructed 
as the normalized mean of these items, ranging between zero and one. 
To operationalize the cost-benefit structure of the collective action dilemma, I use two ques-
tions from the survey. First, I use a measure of “recycling convenience” to operationalize the 
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absence of recycling costs. The item asks whether the local recycling options are “worse than 
in most other places.” Respondents who agree to this question face fewer recycling opportu-
nities and incur larger costs (travel distance, effort, time) when deciding to recycle. The vari-
able is coded such that higher values correspond to better recycling opportunities, and there-
fore represent lower costs. A reverse-coded version of this variable codes a true cost effect, 
and costs will be normalized to a range between zero and one. 
With respect to recycling benefits, Sønderskov (2011) argues that generalized social trust 
should not matter when recycling has direct private benefits, in contrast to a “pure” public 
good situation. However, note that the item used to operationalize the private-versus-public 
perception of recycling (“If I couldn’t recycle, it would be difficult for me to dispose of all 
my refuse.”) is truly asking for the presence of private recycling benefits. It does not allow 
for the additional conclusion of whether or not recycling is perceived as a collective good 
dilemma. From the rational choice and adaptive rationality perspective, it appears reasonable 
to interpret this variable as accruing to recycling benefits as a part of the incentive structure of 
the collective action dilemma. The item is coded such that higher values display higher pri-
vate benefits, once more normalized to the range between zero and one (see Appendix A2). 
3.2. Controls 
The following variables are introduced into the analyses: environmental values, age, gender, 
educational level, income, ethnic minority, place of residence (city size), and trust in recy-
cling authorities (see Sønderskov 2011). In addition, all models were re-calculated after in-
troducing generalized social trust and environmental concern as additional controls. The re-
sults do not change when these variables are included. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
Table 1 assesses the effects of system trust on recycling behavior (see table 1). Model I does 
not include interaction effects. It can be used to test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. First, system 
trust (ST) increases the probability of recycling, not rejecting H1. Obviously, whether or not 
institutional trust is high influences the probability of recycling. With respect to the social 
exchange heuristic explanation, this can be regarded as providing a link between system trust 
and its activation: people with high system trust are more prone to activating the heuristic and 
contributing to the public good than low system trustors. From the adaptive rationality per-
spective, the result can be regarded as providing evidence that the accessibility of generalized 
attitudes towards society´s institutions, their legitimacy and punishment potential prompts 
actors towards adopting norm-compliant behavior whenever these attitudes are accessible. 
Secondly, Model I demonstrates a consistent effect of the cost-benefit structure, in line with 
H2 and H3. For one, private benefits (PB) that accrue from recycling increase recycling activ-
ity. It decreases when it recycling is not a necessary means of disposing waste. At the same 
time, convenience of recycling (CR) positively influences the probability of recycling. Note 
that the variable is coded here to represent the absence of cost. It is therefore estimated posi-
tive. From the estimation results, one can conclude that the presence or absence of recycling 
costs is an important factor in determining the adoption of recycling. If actors do not face 
additional costs, recycling behavior increases.  
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Table 1: Testing H1-H3.  
Model I II III IV (costs) V (alt. costs) 
System Trust (ST) 0.072*** 0.129*** 0.226*** 0.027 0.140*** 
 
(0.027) (0.043) (0.062) (0.051) (0.045) 
Private Benefits (PB) 0.088*** 0.145*** 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.014) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Convenience of  
Recycling (CR)  
0.139*** 0.139*** 0.242*** -0.248*** -0.248*** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Interactions      
ST x PB - -0.108* -0.125*   -0.127*   -0.127*   
  
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
ST x CR - - -0.199*** 0.199*** 0.209*** 
   
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) 
Control Variables                       (insignificant estimates omitted from table)  
Environmental Values               (Reference: Materialist)  
Mixed 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Postmaterialist 0.038** 0.039** 0.037**  0.037**  0.037**  
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Trust Recycling 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income 0.047** 0.048** 0.046**  0.046**  0.046**  
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Generalized Trust - - 0.063** 0.063** 0.064** 
   (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Country                                    (Reference: Sweden)  
Denmark -0.033** -0.033** -0.030**  -0.030**  -0.030**  
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.015) 
UK -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.296*** -0.293*** -0.293*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
US -0.425*** -0.424*** -0.424*** -0.420*** -0.420*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 0.485*** 0.454*** 0.388*** 0.620*** 0.506*** 
 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.048) (0.046) (0.043) 
N 2935 2935 2935 2935        2935 
R
2
 0.414 0.415 0.417 0.417 0.416 
Notes: Method OLS. *, **, ***: p< 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (two-sided). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Model II tests H2a, the hypothesis of an interaction between private benefits and system trust. 
This prediction can be established from the adaptive rationality model: the effect of private 
benefits vanishes with increasing system trust. In other words, instrumental concerns become 
less important when a relevant attitude is accessible. Model II reveals interesting results: both 
17 
 
the coefficients of ST and PB increase when including the interaction term, showing that their 
conditional effects are large when the other variable is zero. At the same time, the interaction 
ST x PB is significant and negative, pointing towards a diminishing effect of PB with increas-
ing system trust. This interpretation is also suggested by the MFS, which predicts a decreas-
ing effect of instrumental variables with increasing attitude or norm accessibility. The data 
are in line with H2a. 
Model III is estimated to test H3a,b,c and discriminate between a rational choice explanation, 
a low-cost-hypothesis explanation, and an adaptive rationality explanation of recycling be-
havior. The results rule out H3a and H3b, which predict either a zero or a positive interaction 
between the convenience of recycling and system trust.
3
 The data support the adaptive ration-
ality hypothesis: the effect of recycling convenience and recycling benefits, that is, of the two 
main incentive variables, disappears with increasing attitude accessibility. Model IV re-
estimates model III using a reverse-coded CR variable. It then displays a real negative cost 
effect, and the sign of the main- and interaction effects consistently change. A difference in 
results is visible in the effect of ST, now estimated positive but insignificant. This difference 
arises from the change of the reference category to which the estimated conditional main ef-
fects accrue (and see below). 
                                                 
3 Keep in mind that hypotheses H3a,b,c in section 2.4 were formulated with respect to recycling costs. The empirical test in 
Model III uses the convenience of recycling for a test. Using convenience instead of recycling costs, a positive interaction 
is expected under H3b. Models III to V additionally control for generalized trust (correlations with ST = r~0.51). 
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Figure 1: Marginal effects of private benefits and recycling costs by system trust. 
 
Figure 1 uses Model IV to graphically analyze the predicted marginal effects of the cost-
benefit variables while varying system trust and holding all other variables constant at their 
mean. As can be seen from the graph, the marginal effects of the two instrumental variables 
approach zero and become insignificant at the 5%-level when system trust increases. The 
marginal effect of PB decreases from 0.15 (p<0.001) to 0.03 (p=0.38), the marginal effect of 
recycling costs decreases from -0.24 (p<0.001) to -0.04 (p=0.26). Overall, these results point 
towards a dual-process explanation of the attitude-behavior link: attitudes, when accessible, 
moderate the impact of the incentive structure. 
To assess the robustness of these results, model III was re-estimated on individual country 
samples. As can be seen from table A1 (see Appendix), the effect of system trust is stable 
across national contexts, although the p-values drop with reduced sample sizes. In the coun-
try-level data, a main effect of system trust cannot be found in the United States (β = 0.14, p 
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< 0.31).
4
 At the same time, recycling benefits have an effect more than twice as large as in 
Denmark, Sweden or the UK. Furthermore, the US is the only country where interactions 
between either of the incentive variables with system trust cannot be found. As a preliminary 
conclusion, to be evaluated in future studies, one could infer that direct incentives are most 
important and system trust is irrelevant to environmental action in the US. This result could 
be explained by a difference in national recycling systems (the US is the only country in the 
sample that has no nation-wide legal acts and regulations to organize recycling) in combina-
tion with a particular understanding about the role of the state in the US public. Secondly, 
while there is a strong and robust effect of convenience of recycling and a clear pattern of 
interaction with system trust in all countries, this result does not hold for the case of recycling 
benefits. This indicates that, in the case of recycling, the direct costs associated with action 
are of more practical relevance for the human actors than individual benefits.  
As a second robustness check, model V re-estimates model IV with an alternative measure of 
recycling costs. As it is, the design of the study is purely correlational, and a potential bias of 
the estimates can occur if the predictors of the model are not truly independent. In an explora-
tion of this issue (not presented here), it was found that respondents with low system trust 
also report higher recycling costs than the sample average. This effect disappears with in-
creasing system trust, suggesting a non-linear relationship between the two variables. Esti-
mating, in a first stage, a model in which the predictors ST and (ST x ST) are used to predict 
CR reveals a significant influence of both variables, verifying such a non-linear relationship. 
This first-stage model explains about 2.5 per-cent of the total variability in the cost variable. 
In model V, the residuals of this regression were used as an alternative cost measure to repre-
sent the “true” cost effect which is unrelated to any systematic influence of system trust. Im-
                                                 
4 Another means to assess the robustness of results is to re-estimate the models using ordered logit specifications. These 
models do not yield substantially different results, and importantly, the fundamental relations among predictors remain 
significant at comparable levels. 
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portantly, neither of the other model variables changes in sign or significance, reassuring that 
the relationships among the model variables are stable. What is more, a conditional effect of 
system trust is now revealed as strongly positive and significant. 
5. Conclusion 
Taking things together, the data allow for a comparative test of the rational choice approach, 
the low-cost-hypothesis, and a dual-process model. All three models explain recycling behav-
ior, but they predict a different sign of interaction between attitudes and incentive structure. 
Using the COP survey data, I have tested these predictions. The analysis points to the validity 
of a dual-process perspective of environmental action. That is, instrumental concerns such as 
costs and benefits, which have long been found to influence environmental behavior, may be 
outweighed by strong attitudes that “take over” and govern action, once an attitude or norm is 
highly internalized and chronically accessible. In this paper, I have focused on system trust, a 
general attitude about the validity, legitimacy and effectiveness of modern institutions. I have 
argued that system trust may work akin to a “meta-norm,” guiding the probability of partici-
pation in cooperative action dilemma situations because it furnishes the activation of the so-
cial exchange heuristic. This argument, initially brought forth by Sønderskov (2011), was 
adapted to the case of system trust. In contrast to generalized social trust, system trust ad-
dresses the perception of social and institutional control, sanctioning and norm-enforcement, 
and thus important factors governing heuristic activation. Note that system trust itself is not a 
“norm.” I argue that it is an ever-present aspect (or “module”) of frames in general, which 
actors use akin to a “meta-norm” when defining a situation. In essence, actors high in system 
trust are more prone to framing situations as being under social and institutional control, and 
this effect transpires into diverse social behaviors, such as cooperation in a public good di-
lemma and recycling. 
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The effects of system trust on norm-compliance are considerable and moderate the effect of 
the incentive structure. Comparing the low-cost and the dual-process model, the current re-
sults contradict the low-cost explanation. While this approach predicts a decreasing effect of 
attitudes with increasing behavioral costs, the dual-process account predicts a decreasing ef-
fect of behavioral costs with increasing attitude or norm accessibility. The empirical results 
are in line with this prediction.  
There are several practical implications for policy and intervention. First, with respect to the 
effects of system trust per se, this study directly reveals how important system trust is for 
individual action and compliance. The study provides a micro-foundation on the claim that 
system trust enhances social system stability and forms the “glue” of modern societies. It was 
shown that high system trustors more readily engage in norm compliant action. In the case of 
voluntary recycling schemes, this means that actors recycle even when they face additional 
costs and irrespective of private benefits from it. Future studies need to investigate this con-
nection between system trust and compliance. Principally, if system trust turns out to work 
akin to a “meta-norm,” increasing the overall probability of norm-compliance, then a direct 
practical implication for policy would be to increase system trust, that is, citizen´s trust in 
modern social institutions whenever a social dilemma has to be solved. 
With respect to environmental policy and intervention, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether more specific attitudes and norms (i.e. environmental concern and pro-environmental 
attitudes) can elicit similar effects with respect to recycling and other forms of pro-
environmental behavior (see already Best & Kneip 2011). If this turns out to be true, one pol-
icy implication would be to devise informational strategies that aim at changing pro-
environmental perceptions, knowledge, norms and attitudes so as to heighten awareness of 
environmental problems and increase knowledge of behavioral alternatives and their pros and 
cons. A change of attitudes may be beneficial to the efficiency of recycling systems and relat-
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ed institutional solutions for environmental protection. Moreover, providing information 
about the behavior of others, for example, through public participation and involvement, or 
via descriptive norms could support environmental behavior by increasing attitude and norm 
accessibility, and by directly changing the probability of social exchange heuristic activation. 
What is more, this study provides evidence for the fact that the incentive structure can pose 
an external barrier to pro-environmental action. Structural intervention strategies should aim 
at changing contextual factors such as the availability of opportunities and the factual costs 
and benefits of environmental action, for example, by providing feasible and closing unde-
sired alternatives, devising legal regulations which are met with some type of enforcement 
and punishment, or decreasing the price of pro-environmental behavior. These interventions 
all aim at altering the incentive structure of the collective dilemma in favor of the pro-
environmental solution, and towards successful public good provision. These strategies may 
be especially relevant for individuals with low norm- or attitude accessibility, for example, a 
low level of system trust. 
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Appendix 
A1: Individual Country Regression Tables 
     
Country / Variable Sweden Denmark UK US 
System Trust 0.326*** 0.382*** 0.324** 0.146 
 
(0.119) (0.098) (0.16) (0.145) 
Private Benefits (PB) -0.002 0.114** 0.121 0.309*** 
 
(-0.083) (0.051) (0.084) (0.091) 
Convenience of  
Recycling (CR) 
0.439*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.191**  
(0.095) (0.057) (0.089) (0.095) 
Interactions     
ST x PB 0.08 -0.132 -0.142 -0.216 
 
(0.118) (-0.093) (-0.178) (-0.179) 
St x CR -0.454*** -0.303*** -0.356* 0.068 
 
(-0.134) (-0.101) (-0.185) (0.185) 
Control Variables                       (insignificant variables omitted from table) 
Environmental Values               (Reference: Materialist) 
Mixed 0.007 0.058*** 0.031 0.035 
 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) 
Postmaterialist 0.024 0.042* 0.024 0.107**  
 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.051) (0.052) 
Age 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.033** 0.024* -0.01 -0.013 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (-0.025) (-0.024) 
Income 0.037 0.057* 0.041 0.114*   
 
(0.029) (0.03) (0.057) (0.059) 
Trust Recycling 0.108*** 0.057** 0.033 0.065 
 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.046) (0.05) 
Constant 0.407*** 0.371*** 0.121 -0.125 
 
(0.101) (0.072) (0.103) (-0.106) 
N 716 752 716 751 
R
2
 0.133 0.139 0.05 0.151 
Notes: Method OLS. *, **, ***: p< 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, respectively (two-sided). Standard errors in parentheses. 
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A2: Survey Items / Variable Coding Information 
 
Variable Wording/Coding Range Mean Std. Dev. 
Recycling How large a share of your refuse do you recycle within the following catgegories?    
Item 1 Paper/Cardboard 1-5 4.14 1.44 
Item 2 Batteries 1-5 3.58 1.72 
Item3 Electronics 1-5 3.67 1.66 
Recycling Behavior Mean of items 1-3, rescaled from 0 to 1    
System Trust How much do you personally trust each of the following institutions?    
Item1 ‘The legal system’ (11-point scale) 0–10 5.67 2.66 
Item2 ‘Congress’ (11-point scale) 0–10 4.43 2.65 
Item3 ‘The police’ (11-point scale) 0–10 6.29 2.45 
Item4 ‘The civil services’ (11-point scale) 0–10 5.24 2.34 
Item5 ‘The government’ (11-point scale) 0–10 4.14 2.77 
System Trust Mean of items 1-5, rescaled from 0 to 1 0-1 0.51 .21 
Country mean of system trust Sweden 0–1 0.51 0.19 
 Denmark  0.67 0.16 
 UK  0.41 0.20 
 USA  0.46 0.20 
Convenience of recycling (CR) ‘The recycling options where I live are worse than in most other places in the US’ c (5 categories; 
inverted and rescaled to a 0–1 range) 
0–1 0.62 0.32 
Private benefits (PB) ‘If I couldn’t recycle, it would be difficult for me to dispose of all my refuse’ (5 categories; invert-
ed and rescaled to a 0–1 range) 
0–1 0.48 0.35 
Generalized Social Trust     
Item1 ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?’ (11-point scale) 
0–10 5.75 2.59 
Item2 ‘Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or 
would they try to be fair?’ (11-point scale) 
0–10 5.90 2.39 
Item3 ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out 
for themselves?’ (11-point scale) 
0–10 5.45 2.33 
Generalized Social Trust Mean of items 1-3, rescaled to a range 0-1    
Country mean of generalized  Sweden 0–1 0.64 0.20 
social trust Denmark  0.68 0.18 
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 UK  0.45 0.21 
 USA  0.47 0.22 
Environmental Values Inglehart’s 4-item postmaterialism measure (cf. Inglehart 1997, Chapter 4) (3 categories repre-
sented with dummy variables) 
   
Age ‘Please indicate which year you were born’ (recoded to age in years) 18–88 0.45 13.50 
Gender (Females rel. to men) ‘Please indicate your gender’ (females = 1) 0, 1 0.53 – 
Educational level ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained?’ (9 categories) (rescaled to a 0–1 
range)a 
0–1 0.65 0.27 
Income ‘What is the current household income before taxes?’ (10 categories, rescaled to a 0–1 range)b 0–1 0.36 0.26 
Ethnic majority/minority (Na-
tives relative to immigrants) 
‘Finally, we would like to know if you were born in USA.’ c (Natives = 1) 0, 1 0.94 – 
City size ‘Do you live in ...?’ ([‘A city with 500,000 or more residents’] and so on; 5 categories represented 
with dummy variables; see Table 2) 
– – – 
Gender (Females rel. to men) ‘Please indicate your gender’ (females = 1) 0, 1 0.53 – 
Educational level ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained?’ (9 categories) (rescaled to a 0–1 
range)a 
0–1 0.65 0.27 
Income ‘What is the current household income before taxes?’ (10 categories, rescaled to a 0–1 range)b 0–1 0.36 0.26 
Ethnic majority/minority  
(Natives relative to immigrants) 
‘Finally, we would like to know if you were born in USA.’ c (Natives = 1) 0, 1 0.94 – 
Trust in recycling authorities 
(Trust recycling) 
‘You can trust that the majority of the refuse sent for recycling are actually recycled’ (5 catego-
ries; rescaled to a 0–1 range) 
0–1 0.63 0.26 
Notes: All variables (except dummy variables) are coded so higher values signify higher recycling/trust/age/education/income/convenience etc..  
a. The name and the number of categories vary between countries. The categories are the same as in the General Social Survey (US), European Social Survey (DK + SE), and European Values Study (UK).  
b. The categories vary between countries but are equivalent.  
c. The wording varies between countries but is equivalent. 
 
 
 
